En este artículo se analiza la concepción perspectivista del conocimiento, tal como es expuesta por Leibniz en los Nuevos Ensayos, como uno de los aspectos que marca la originalidad de este pensador en la Ilustración racionalista. Se defenderá que esta concepción se sustenta en dos tesis. En primer lugar, Leibniz sostiene que todo conocimiento humano es esencialmente perspectivista, pero esto no impide sostener, contra el escepticismo, que en cada caso las diferentes perspectivas ofrecen un conocimiento diverso de un mismo mundo. (...) En segundo lugar, para que esta perspectiva pueda ser considerada como racional y posibilite la sabiduría es preciso que tal perspectiva se reconozca a sí misma de modo auto-reflexivo como tal, es decir como un conocimiento parcial y confuso de una realidad con sentido. (shrink)

O presente artigo trata da influência exercida pela filosofia kantiana na actualidade a partir da chamada crise da Modernidade ilustrada. Os autores começam por analisar o posicionamento original kantiano, incidindo especialmente na sua concepção do criticismo e do transcendentalismo. Esta análise é feita a partir da perspectiva da aberta pela Kritik der Urteilskraft enquanto marco do sistema da razão, capaz de incorporar a finitude da mesma. Seguidamente são analisadas a recepção e a transformação do pensamento kantiano a partir de duas (...) correntes filosóficas actuais: o Racionalismo Crítico de Karl Popper e Hans Albert, e a Pragmática Transcendental da linguagem de KarlOtto Apel. Em ambos os casos se compara o seu modo próprio de incorporar as noções de crítica e transcendentalidade com a concepção original de Kant. (shrink)

O presente artigo trata da influência exercida pela filosofia kantiana na actualidade a partir da chamada crise da Modernidade ilustrada. Os autores começam por analisar o posicionamento original kantiano, incidindo especialmente na sua concepção do criticismo e do transcendentalismo. Esta análise é feita a partir da perspectiva da aberta pela Kritik der Urteilskraft enquanto marco do sistema da razão, capaz de incorporar a finitude da mesma. Seguidamente são analisadas a recepção e a transformação do pensamento kantiano a partir de duas (...) correntes filosóflcas actuais: o Racionalismo Crítico de Karl Popper e Hans Albert, e a Pragmática Transcendental da linguagem de Karl-Otto Apel. Em ambos os casos se compara o sen modo próprio de incorporar as noções de crítica e transcendentalidade com a concepção original de Kant. /// The article addresses the influence of Kantian philosophy in contemporary thought from the view point of the crisis of illustrated Modernity. The authors start by analyzing the original Kantian position, whereby particular attention is given to his conception of criticism and transcendentalism. This analysis is worked out from the perspective of the Kritik der Urteilskraft as a frame for the system of reason, able to incorporate the finitude of reason itself This is followed by a detailed analysis of the reception and the transformation of illustrated thinking performed by two contemporary philosophical schools: Critical Rationalism (Karl Popper and Hans Albert), and Transcendental Pragmatics of language (Karl-Otto Apel). The authors of the article compare in each case the adoption of the notions of critique and transcendentality with the original use that Kant himself makes of them. (shrink)

This article researches the historical and systematic background of Kant’s reflecting power of judgment theory based on a historical study of the concept of wit [ingenium, Witz]. Although the Notes from Lessons on Anthropology even expound the meaning of this concept in the context of Baumgarten’s empirical psychology, this material helps us interpret the concept of wit as one of the most important precedents of the reflecting power of judgment theory presented in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment. The (...) exposition of wit furthermore highlights the systematic and historic connection between the third Critique and the theory of the hypothetical use of reason found in the Appendix of the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason. (shrink)

: The aim of this article is to explore the origin of the difficulty of founding the reflecting power of judgment as Kant outlines it in the Preface of the third Critique. Although a foundation for this faculty was only established in 1790, we must interpret it as a critical solution to an old problem, which Kant had already recognized around 1770. Through his comprehension of the meaning of healthy understanding and native wit he already confirms the impossibility of determining (...) the correctness of our judging activity from the use of rules. This approach of the problem must be understood in the context of the controversy about the concept ‘logica naturalis’ in the Leibniz-Wolffian aesthetics and logic. In close conjunction with this tradition, Kant already tries to offer an elucidation of the question of judging through the aesthetics. (shrink)

En este escrito se presenta el proyecto de traducción y edición de los Fragmentos sobre estética. Una selección crítica a partir de los Apuntes de Lecciones sobre Antropología de Kant. A partir de un estudio histórico-volutivo sobre el desarrollo de su proyecto estético desde 1770 a 1790, se han seleccionado y traducido los textos sobre estética contenidos en el volumen 25 de la edición de la Academia. En el presente escrito se defiende la pertinencia de estos materiales para una comprensión (...) histórica de la génesis y formación de la Crítica del Juicio, en el contexto general de la reflexión de Kant sobre los problemas y temas de tipo sistemático que afectan a la fundamentación crítica de la racionalidad. (shrink)

This paper deals with the role played by the imagination in the Transcendental Deduction argument from Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft, and it is focused specially on the differences between the 1781 edition and the 1787 edition. My aim is to put into question the starting point of Heidegger’s interpretation as he presented in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. In contrast I will provide a construal of both editions, according to which it is actually in the second edition where (...) Kant reached a proper understanding of the autonomy of imagination in the argument. If the first edition bestowed such an important role on this faculty, it is because Kant had not still distinguished sharply between the subjective and the objective dimensions of its activity in the process of knowledge, as it is remarkably revealed if one pays a close attention to 1780s Kant’s “aesthetic project”. Whereas in the 1787 edition Kant is only centred on the determining activity of imagination qua transcendental, as long as the Deduction is to prove merely the objective validity of knowledge. Against Heidegger, I claim that such exclusion of the subjective and sensible dimension of imagination in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft is due to the fact that in 1787 Kant had found a new place to tackle this question within the general framework of the critical foundation of metaphysics, namely, the Kritik der Urteilskraft. (shrink)